

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON

INVESTIGATION NO. 2861
THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY
REPORT IN RE ACCIDENT
AT CARROLL, MD., ON
JANUARY 17, 1945

SUMMARY

Railroad: Baltimore & Ohio
Date: January 17, 1945
Location: Carroll, Md.
Kind of accident: Side collision
Trains involved: Engine : Freight
Train numbers: Extra 4443 West : Extra 4623 West
Engine numbers: 4443 : 4623
Consist: : 35 cars, caboose
Estimated speed: 3 m. p. h. : 10 m. p. h.
Operation: Interlocking
Track: Double; 9°58' curve; practically level
Weather: Clear
Time: 7:32 a. m.
Casualties: 1 killed; 1 injured
Cause: Failure to obey interlocking signal indication

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

INVESTIGATION NO. 2861

IN THE MATTER OF MAKING ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS
UNDER THE ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT OF MAY 6, 1910.

THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY

March 5, 1945.



Accident at Carroll, Md., on January 17, 1945, caused by
failure to obey an interlocking signal indication.

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION¹

PATTERSON, Commissioner:

On January 17, 1945, there was a side collision between an engine and a freight train on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at Carroll, Md., which resulted in the death of one employee, and the injury of one employee.

¹Under authority of section 17 (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act the above-entitled proceeding was referred by the Commission to Commissioner Patterson for consideration and disposition.



Inv. No. 2861
 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad
 Carroll, Md.
 January 17, 1945

Location of Accident and Method of Operation

This accident occurred on that part of the Baltimore Terminal Division extending northward from Carroll to Mt. Clare Jct., Md., 1 mile. This was a double-track line. Within interlocking limits at Carroll this line converged with a double-track line extending westward from Camden Station, Baltimore, Md., to F Tower, near Washington, D. C., 35.3 miles. Time-table directions were eastward and westward for both lines. Hereinafter, time-table directions will be used in this report. The main tracks extending between Carroll and Mt. Clare Jct. were designated, from north to south, as track No. 3, westward slow-speed track, and track No. 4, eastward slow-speed track. The main tracks extending between Camden Station and F Tower were designated, from north to south, as track No. 1, westward high-speed track, and track No. 2, eastward high-speed track. In the vicinity of Carroll an auxiliary track, hereinafter referred to as track No. 5, paralleled track No. 3 on the north. Switch 10, which connected tracks No. 1 and No. 3, and switch 11, which connected tracks No. 3 and No. 5, were, respectively, 100 feet east and 329 feet west of the tower. The accident occurred at the fouling point of track No. 3 and the turnout of track No. 5, at a point 141 feet east of switch 11. From the east track No. 1 was tangent 2,586 feet to switch 10, and beyond this switch on track No. 3 there was a 9°58' curve to the right 288 feet to the point of accident. The grade was practically level.

Interlocking signal 28, governing west-bound movements from track No. 1 through switch 10 to track No. 3, and interlocking signal 24, governing movements from track No. 5 through switch 11 to track No. 3, were, respectively, 1,097 feet and 60 feet east of the point of accident. Signal 28 was of the color-position-light type, and signal 24 was a dwarf signal of the one-arm, upper-quadrant, semaphore type. The involved aspects and corresponding indications and names of these signals were as follows:

<u>Signal</u>	<u>Aspect</u>	<u>Indication</u>	<u>Name</u>
28	Two yellow lights in diagonal position to the right.	Proceed at slow speed, preparing to stop at next signal and be governed by indication displayed by that signal.	Slow Approach.
24	Horizontal, red.	Stop.	Stop.

The interlocking machine was of the mechanical type. Approach and electric-switch locking were provided. Time releases in connection with approach locking were provided.

Operating rules read in part as follows:

SPEED RESTRICTIONS.

Normal Speed--The maximum speed permitted by timetables for main track movements.

* * *

Slow Speed--One-quarter of the normal speed, not to exceed fifteen (15) miles per hour.

* * *

34. All members of train and engine crews will, when practicable, communicate to each other the indication of each signal affecting the movement of their train or engine.

663. Trains or engines must not pass an interlocking stop-signal without receiving a Clearance Card Form A, or hand signals. * * *

The maximum authorized speed for movements through the switches of the interlocking at Carroll was 10 miles per hour.

Description of Accident

Extra 4443 West, a west-bound engine headed eastward, stopped on track No. 5 in the vicinity of the tower at Carroll about 7:29 a. m. About 3 minutes later, while moving westward on track No. 5 at an estimated speed of 3 miles per hour, this engine passed signal 24, which displayed stop, entered the turnout of switch 11 and was struck by Extra 4623 West.

Extra 4623 West, a west-bound freight train, consisted of engine 4623, 35 cars and a caboose. This train passed Camden Station at 7:25 a. m., passed signal 28, which displayed slow-approach, entered track No. 3 at switch 10 and while moving at an estimated speed of 10 miles per hour it struck Extra 4443 West.

Engine 4443 was derailed. The engine of each train, and the first three cars of Extra 4623 were damaged.

The weather was clear at the time of the accident, which occurred at 7:32 a. m.

The fireman of Extra 4443 was killed, and the front brakeman of Extra 4623 was injured.

Discussion

About 7:31 a. m., the leverman at Carroll lined the route for Extra 4623 West to proceed from track No. 1 through switch 10 to track No. 3. Signal 28 displayed slow-approach for Extra 4623 and signal 24 displayed stop for Extra 4443.

As Extra 4623 was approaching the point where the accident occurred the enginemen were maintaining a lookout ahead. The engineer said that immediately after his engine entered track No. 3 he saw engine 4443 enter the turnout of switch 11 and foul track No. 3. He immediately moved the brake valve to emergency position, but the accident occurred before his train could be stopped.

The engineer of Extra 4443 understood that an interlocking signal displaying stop must not be passed by a train unless proper authority from the leverman has been received. He said that he did not see the indication displayed by signal 24, but he understood the fireman to say that this signal displayed restricting, which permitted a movement from track No. 5 through switch 11 to track No. 3, and he was not aware that Extra 4623 was closely approaching on track No. 3 until the accident occurred.

The controlling circuits of the interlocking were so arranged that, when the route was lined for movement from track No. 1 to track No. 3, signal 24 would display stop, and an interval of at least 2 minutes must elapse before this route could be changed and signal 24 could display an indication permitting movement from track No. 5 to track No. 3. In tests after the accident the interlocking functioned properly. If Extra 4443 had stopped on track No. 5 at signal 24, in accordance with the stop indication displayed by that signal, this accident would not have occurred.

Cause

It is found that this accident was caused by failure to obey an interlocking signal indication.

Dated at Washington, D. C., this fifth
day of March, 1945.

By the Commission, Commissioner Patterson.

(SEAL)

W. P. BARTEL,
Secretary.