The Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, D. C.

Dear Sirs:

On August 18, the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway reported by tre an accident which occurred near Grand View Avenue, about three miles west of Columbus, Ohio. Inspectors C. C. Cash and J. J. Coutts were essigned to make an investigation, and I berewith submit summary of their report:

Train No. 46 on the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway, hauled by Big Four engine 6418, consisting of one mail car, one baggage car, three conches, and one dining car and the Pullman eleopers, was derailed at a switch leading to the Toledo & Ohio Central Railway's transfer track near Grand View Avence, about three miles west of Columbus, Chio, at 12:02 p. m., August 18, resulting in injuries to forty-five passengers, some of them serious.

The Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway orcsses the Toledo & Ohio Central Railway about three miles west of Columbus, Ohio. This crossing is protected by a mechanical, namual controlled interlocking plant, which is under the control and supervision of the Toledo & Chio Central Railway Company. The switches and signals are operated from a tower located just east of the crossing.

Passenger train No. 4, on the Toledo & Ohio Central Railway, had just passed this prossing. When the Towerman placed the signals back to normal on the Toledo & Obio Central hallway, and endoavored to line the signals and switches for Big Four train No. 46, he discovered that lever No. 7 would not work. This is the lever that looks switch No. 6, leading into the Tolddo & Ohio Central transfer track, and which must be looked before the to ergan can give the clear "Home" and "Distant" signals to Big Four trains. Upon discovering that this lever would not work be disconnected lever No. 7 which throws the plunge or lock, and lever No. 6 which throws No. 6 switch points. The switch points then had nothing to hold them in proper position except their own reight. After disconnecting these two levers the mechanically controlled features on the interlocker were removed, and the towerman coult give train No. 45 the clear "Ecme" and "distant" signals, which he did, and allowed the train to pass over this facing switch in this insecure and locse condition. The to erman stated that when he noticed No. 46 approaching at a high rate of speed he gave the engineer a alow down signal with his hand, pointing to the track, indicating to the engineman that something was wrong with the track or awitch. On receiving this signal the engineers applied the air brakes in the energency, and reduced exced from 50 miles an hour, so that at the time of the derailment the train was running about 25 miles on hour. But for the engineeran's prompt action in this particular it appears certain that the loss of life would have been great. All of the signals are on a straight track with nothing to obstruct the view for the distance of more than half a mile, and where so set as to indicate to train No. 46 the right to proceed at schedule speed.

The engine and three cars passed over this smitch, the fourth car and all cars following being decailed. The two day coaches after decailment ran on the ties for about 5000 feet and then turned over on their sides, the dining car and one cleaper turned over, the remaining car decailed standing in an uplight position. Most of the injured passengers were in the day coaches which surmed over on their sides.

Rules 620, 625 and 624 of the Toledo & Ohio Central Railway read as follows:

Rule 620. If a signal fails to work properly, its operation must be discontinued and the signal secured so as to give the normal indication until repaired.

Rule 623. If there is a derailment, or a switch is run through, or if any issage coour to the track or interiogking plant, the signals must be restored so as to give the normal indication, and no train or switching movement permitted until all parts of the interlocking plant and track liable to consequent injury have been examined and are known to be in a safe condition.

Rule 624. If necessary to disconnect a switch from the interlocking apparatus the switch must be securely fastened.

These rules were not examined with.

The toverage in charge of this interlocking plant had been employed by the Tolego & Ohio Central Railway at this tover since May 31, 1911. He was about 45 years of age, and upon taking charge of this tover was instructed in the work for three days by the to arean whom he relieved. He had no other experience as towermon or interlocking operator, but had been employed for four or five years at some previous time as a crossing watchman. This tower is not a train order or block signal station, and no records are kept on passing trains.

This accident was caused by the to erman disconnecting that part of the interlocking plant that secured the facing switch points of switch No. 6, leaving into the Toledo & Ohio Central transfer tracks, and disregarding the rules and instructions requiring him to securely fasten any disconnected exitch before giving clear signals for a train to pass over it.

Respectfully submitted,

Chief Inspector.