MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT

RAILWAY ACCIDENTS

REPORT ON THE COLLISION which occurred on 9th June 1953 near GOLLANFIELD JUNCTION in the SCOTTISH REGION BRITISH RAILWAYS

LONDON : HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
1953

TWO SHILLINGS NET

MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT,
Berkeley Square House,
London, W.1.
31*st August*, 1953.

SIR,

I have the honour to report for the information of the Minister of Transport, in accordance with the Order dated 10th June, 1953, the result of my Inquiry into the collision which occurred at about 8.34 p.m. on the previous day near Gollanfield Junction, on the single line section of the Inverness–Keith branch line in the Scottish Region, British Railways.

An Up passenger train and a Down unfitted freight train collided head on at a combined speed of 60–70 m.p.h. The former was the 8.17 p.m. stopping train from Inverness to Keith. It left the previous station (Dalcross) under clear signals and was approaching the Gollanfield home signal which was at Danger, at 15–20 m.p.h. The freight train was booked to leave Keith at 5.45 p.m. for Inverness. After passing the Gollanfield distant signal at Caution, it ran through the station at speed, passed the Down starting signal at Danger and was travelling at 45–50 m.p.h. when the collision occurred about 150 yards beyond the Up facing points. The driver had failed to control the speed of the train and he had been misled by the irregular and premature lowering of the Down home signal.

I regret to report that the drivers of both trains and the fireman of the passenger train were killed. The fireman of the freight train jumped out and suffered severely from shock and bruises. The passenger train carried only three passengers. One of them, a railway fireman travelling home in the leading coach, was seriously injured. The other passengers were at the rear of the train and suffered slightly from shock.

Immediate calls were sent out for assistance ; a doctor and a nurse arrived from Ardersier at 9.10 p.m., and an ambulance from Inverness at 9.20 p.m. The medical officer of the nearby Royal Air Force Depot at Dalcross heard of the accident and arrived on the scene with an ambulance at 8.55 p.m. The two injured firemen were removed to hospital and were detained, but Fireman MacKintosh, who had jumped, was discharged shortly afterwards.

The weather was fine but cloudy, and the rails were dry. It was broad daylight at the time.

DESCRIPTION

The Line

2. Gollanfield Junction is situated on the former London Midland & Scottish Railway between Nairn, which is 5½ miles to the East (Up direction), and Inverness and Dalcross which are 9 miles and 2½ miles respectively to the West. It is a simple crossing station on the single line with an Up and a Down loop, and is equipped with a distant, home and starting signal for each direction. A short branch line to Fort George connects with the Up loop, but this had no bearing on the accident.

The attached plan shows the arrangements.

In the Down direction, the line from Nairn rises gradually at gradients of 1 in 200 to 1 in 250 for about 4 miles and then runs level for about ½ mile. It then falls at gradients of 1 in 230 and 1 in 280 for a distance of just over a mile through Gollanfield. There is an important level crossing on the level section about 1¼ miles from the station. Nearing Gollanfield the line swings to the right under a road overbridge (No. 83) through which the Down distant signal can first be seen from the right hand side of the footplate at a distance of 194 yards ; from the left hand side the sighting distance is slightly less. After passing through the bridge the line is straight to the station. The Down home comes into view from the bridge, but its aspect cannot be seen clearly until the distant signal is reached.

Passing through the station the line swings to the left and a glimpse can be got of the Down starter from the left hand side of the footplate through a road overbridge and a footbridge at a distance of 300 yards, but it comes into full view only at a distance of 230 yards. After passing through the station the line continues to fall towards Dalcross, beyond which the line is double to Inverness.

From the signal box at Gollanfield, Down trains can first be seen when passing through bridge No. 83. Up trains can be seen only when they are very close to the Up home signal.

Train working to Dalcross is by key token and to Nairn by tablet ; the instruments are in the booking office on the Down platform. Signals and points are worked from the signal box nearly opposite on the Up loop. The normal positions of the east and west facing points are for the Down and the Up loops respectively.

There is an overall speed limit of 75 m.p.h. on the line and the maximum speed permitted through Gollanfield is 40 m.p.h.

The Trains.

3. The passenger train comprised four coaches and it was drawn by a Class 3, 4–4–0 type, tender engine, weighing 108 tons. The total weight of the train was 220 tons. The coaches were fitted with shock absorbing buffers.

The freight train consisted of 39 goods vehicles and a 20 ton brake van weighing 379 tons. It was drawn by a Class 5 mixed traffic tender engine, 4–6–0 type, which weighed 126 tons and was driven from the left hand side. The engine was equipped with a vacuum operated steam brake working on the coupled and tender wheels. None of the goods vehicles were vacuum braked. The total brake power available, including that of the brake van, was 92.4 tons or 18.3% of the total weight of the train, which was 505 tons. The length of the train was 288 yards.

The Damage.

4. As stated above, the combined speed of the two trains at the time of the collision was high and the resulting damage was very heavy.

The passenger train engine became a tangled mass of metal and was scarcely recognisable as a locomotive. The four leading compartments of the first coach were demolished. The second coach also sustained heavy damage, but the remaining two coaches escaped fairly lightly.

The heavy freight train engine was thrown on its side almost at right angles to the track and was also wrecked beyond repair with the destruction of the front bogie and the severe buckling of the main frames. The leading 11 wagons, all of which were empty, were demolished, and the debris from them formed a pile round the engine tender. The twelfth wagon was only slightly damaged, and the next 13 and the last 10 wagons and the brake van were intact, but the intervening four wagons were damaged, three of them extensively.

The extent of the damage suggested that the combined speed of the trains at the time of the impact was 60–70 m.p.h.

Regulations

5. The following is an extract from the former London Midland & Scottish Railway Company's regulations for train signalling on single lines, which are still in force on the section of the line concerned :—

> "Working of fixed signals :—(*a*) When trains which have to cross each other are approaching a token station in opposite directions, the signals in both directions must be kept at Danger and when the train which has first to be allowed to draw forward has been brought to a stand, the home signal applicable to such train may be taken off to allow it to draw forward to the station or to the starting signal, and after it has again come to a stand and the Signalman has ascertained that the line on which the other train will arrive is clear, the necessary signals for that train may be taken off."

The equivalent regulation of the London and North Eastern Railway Company permits the signalman to lower the home signal for the first train when it has *nearly* come to a stand at the signal. This regulation is still in force on adjacent sections of the line once owned by that Company.

6. The following is an extract from Rule 39(*a*) of the Rules for British Railways :—

> "39(*a*). When a stop signal is at Danger the stop signal next in rear of it and worked from the same signal box must not be lowered for an approaching train until the train is close to such signal and has been brought quite or nearly, to a stand."

Report and Evidence

7. The passenger train, which had run for the first time on the previous day when the summer time table was introduced, left Dalcross on time at 8.29 p.m. and was due at Gollanfield at 8.34 p.m. It was under control and its speed had been reduced to 15–20 m.p.h. after passing the Up distant at Caution and as it was approaching the Up home signal which was at Danger.

The freight train was due to leave Forres at 9.10 p.m., but it was running ahead of time and left there, after attaching 6 wagons, at 7.55 p.m. It arrived at Nairn at 8.12 p.m. and left at 8.22 p.m., after 20 wagons had been attached.

8. The crew of the freight train when the accident took place were—

D. Urquhart	..	driver (killed)
L. MacKintosh	..	fireman
J. Shand	..	guard

Urquhart and MacKintosh came on duty at Inverness at 5.15 p.m., both having worked in the Shed from 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. the previous day, Monday, 8th June. Before that Urquhart had been on rest since the Friday evening. All three men worked the 6.40 p.m. Up freight train from Inverness to Forres where they arrived at 7.30 p.m., and where they took over the Down freight train.

Evidence of train crew.

9. Fireman MacKintosh is 26 years old. He joined the former London Midland & Scottish Railway as a cleaner in 1944, became a passed cleaner within a month and was promoted to fireman in 1951 after firing regularly for 3 years. He had suffered severely from shock and his recollection of the course of events leading up to the accident was rather hazy. The following is what I believe to be the information he wished to convey to me.

After taking over the Down train at Forres, Urquhart left him to do the shunting and went to the lavatory, being away 10–15 minutes. The run from Forres to Nairn was normal. The train was stopped, without difficulty, at the home signal for the shunting to be done. When that was completed the signalman asked him how long they would take to reach Gollanfield and, after enquiring from Urquhart, he replied "10 minutes". The signalman had given no reason for asking the question, but MacKintosh thought it was on account of a following train.

After completing the shunt at Nairn the train started and MacKintosh exchanged tablets by hand as the engine passed the booking office. The tablet for the advance section was made over in a ring which he hung on his (the right hand) side of the cab. The run to Gollanfield was rather faster than usual. Approaching that station Urquhart had taken the tablet from the ring and placed it in a pouch on the catcher on the left hand side of the engine. MacKintosh saw the distant signal at Caution but thought that Urquhart had not seen it. He therefore went across the footplate and told Urquhart who immediately shut the regulator and put the brake on fully. This was somewhere just past the Down distant and it was somewhere between that signal and the home signal that MacKintosh first saw the home signal, which he said was at Clear.

The driver released the brakes after the initial full application and then applied them gradually. They did not appear to reduce the speed of the train, which he could not estimate, until it was passing the platform and then only slightly, but he thought the train was pushing the engine. He went over to the left hand side of the engine to receive the outgoing token but he saw that no exchange had taken place. He did not see the starting signal. He caught sight of the passenger train ahead as they passed over the trailing points. He said to the driver "You'll never stop" and jumped. He thought that by that time the driver had appeared to make no serious effort to stop. He had not used sand, had not put the engine into reverse and had not applied nor asked him to apply the hand brake. No attempt had been made to seek the guard's assistance to stop the train by sounding the appropriate whistle code.

MacKintosh was unaware of the running of the 8.17 p.m. passenger train and he did not know whether the driver knew about it. It was the first occasion he had been on the footplate with Urquhart or on this section of the line, for some time. He thought Urquhart was quite normal. He was a man of few words and they had not talked of anything on the footplate.

10. Guard Shand said that the trip from Forres to Nairn was normal. From Nairn onwards, however, he thought the speed was higher than usual. It had not slackened as the train was approaching the level crossing and he therefore applied the van brake. He knew his train would cross the Up passenger train at Gollanfield and expected to find the distant at Caution, and when he saw it in that position he screwed on the brake as hard as possible. He looked out from the back of the van for a second to see if he could see the driver and then went back into the van and braced himself for the collision which he expected. He saw the Home signal was " Off " as the train approached it, and also saw it go back to "On" as the engine was passing it.

Shand thought the steam had been shut off near the distant but he did not know whether the engine brakes had been applied. He gained the impression that the engine was pulling the train the whole time and that the speed had slackened but little before the collision. He said that according to his watch the collision occurred just after 8.33 p.m., 11 minutes after starting from the Up home signal at Nairn.

Shand said he knew Urquhart and had spoken to him at Inverness and again at Forres, and had found him quite normal.

Evidence of Station Staff.

11. Signalman A. MacKay, who was on duty at Nairn, said that as the shunting was being finished he asked the fireman of the freight train how long the driver would take to reach Gollanfield and that, after consulting the driver, the fireman had replied "10 minutes". This information was conveyed to the signalman at Gollanfield who then accepted the train. MacKay said that no reason was given for the question and he assumed the driver would appreciate it was in connection with crossing the 8.17 p.m. Up passenger train at Gollanfield. There was a margin of 27 minutes for the freight train to go ahead of the next Down passenger train.

12. Signalman A. MacDonald had started to work on the late shift at Gollanfield (3.10 p.m. to 10.30 p.m.) the previous day after being on rest on Sunday. He related that he accepted the freight train at 8.20 p.m. having received information from Nairn of the type of engine, the load, and an assurance that the driver "will make it all right". He also gave "Line Clear" for the 8.17 p.m. Up passenger train from Dalcross at the same time. He realised that the cross would be, to use his own words, "a neat one". He then went into the box and pulled the locking plunger levers of both loop facing points, keeping both home signals at Danger. He saw the Down freight train come through bridge No. 83 and went to the west end of the frame to see whether the passenger train was in sight, but could not see it nor did he hear it whistle. He said that by then the freight train was fully half way between the distant and home signals and he thought its speed was under control for stopping at the station, so he lowered the Down home signal. He did not touch the starting signal lever which was locked by the lever of the Up facing points in the normal position.

Soon afterwards, however, he realised the freight train was travelling too fast so he put the signal back to Danger before the engine passed it. He tried unsuccessfully to attract the attention of the driver by shouting from the window and then, realising that the train would overshoot the starter, he unlocked and reversed the Up facing points. He did this to prevent the points being burst and so as to be able to back the train after it had stopped. He did not anticipate it would collide with the passenger train and was surprised when he was told that it had done so.

13. MacDonald would not give an estimate of the speed of the train as it passed the box nor could he draw a comparison between its speed and that of a train running through on a clear distant signal. All he would say was that "it was going pretty fast". He did not hear the couplings come together as they would if the driver was braking hard.

He said that as the Down line approaching the box was straight, it was difficult to judge the speed of trains, and they often appeared to be travelling more slowly than they actually were. He said he realised that the single line Regulations required the first train to be brought to a stand at the home signal, but he thought that Rule 39(*a*) permitted the signal to be lowered when it was nearly at a stand. He considered that the Regulations conflicted with Rule 39(*a*). He had not, however, asked anyone to clarify the issue because he had a recollection that the Inspector, who had first examined him, said that the signal could be lowered when the first train was nearly at a stand. He said that this was the usual procedure he adopted.

14. MacDonald admitted that he had seen and read a circular issued by the Operating Superintendent, Scottish Region, on 19th February, and thought it had probably been placed on the notice board at the station. (This circular is reproduced as an Appendix). He did not think that anyone had drawn his special attention to any particular item in it.

MacDonald is 49 years of age. He qualified as a porter signalman in 1944 and has spent most of his time since then at Gollanfield.

15. Mr. R. MacDonald, Station Master, Gollanfield, said that as soon as he heard of the accident he went to the station, and saw all the signals were normal. He, also, thought that the Regulations permitted the home signal for the first of two trains to cross at a single line station to be lowered when that train was nearly at a stand.

When I reopened the Inquiry I again questioned Mr. MacDonald. He said that he had read the circular mentioned above, and believed that he had drawn the special attention of the staff to it. He thought he remembered telling the signalman "They are getting more strict in the rules" or using words like that. He still considered that there was confliction between Rule 39(*a*) and the single line Regulations and that, if there was a sufficient margin between the arrival time of crossing trains, the home signal could under the former rule be lowered for the first train when it was nearly at a stand. He said this notwithstanding the fact that he had been examined in the Rules and Regulations during the interval since I had first questioned him.

Mr. R. MacDonald is 52 years old. He joined the former London, Midland & Scottish Railway in 1919 and was promoted signalman in 1922, and station master in 1938. He has been at Gollanfield since 1946.

Evidence of other staff.

16. Sub ganger A. Nicol was standing at the east end of the station as the freight train approached. He saw the train pass the home signal which was " Off " and thought from its speed that it was being given a clear run through the station. Then, however, he saw the distant at Caution and realised that the train was going much too fast to stop at the starter. He did not see the home signal put to Danger nor did he notice if the brakes on the train were being applied.

17. Mr. J. Paterson, Station Master, Aviemore, had been District Inspector at Inverness up to April 1953. He said that he examined Signalman MacDonald in January 1952, at Gollanfield, and found him well conversant with the Rules and Regulations. He always made a point of asking questions on the single line Regulations, particularly those concerning the crossing of trains. He had never heard it suggested that Rule 39(*a*) could be applied to the first of two trains approaching a single line crossing station.

Mr. Paterson knew that the Regulations of the two former railway companies differed somewhat. He said that signalmen from the London & North Eastern Railway were sometimes transferred to boxes on sections of the line originally on the London Midland & Scottish Railway, but he had never had occasion to examine such men.

18. Mr. R. M. Campbell, District Inspector, Inverness, said that on account of the alteration from one year to two years in the interval between the examinations of signalmen, he had examined only one, a new entry, since he was appointed in April 1953. While travelling over the district he had on many occasions witnessed the crossing of trains and had always seen that the Regulations were observed.

He referred to the booklet "Railway Block Telegraph Regulations" written by a district inspector which was widely read by signalmen. He said a copy of it is at Gollanfield.

19. Mr. T. Bell, Yard Master, Mossend, was formerly Chief District Inspector, Inverness. He said he examined Mr. MacDonald, Station Master, Gollanfield, in the Rules and Regulations in September, 1951, and found his knowledge satisfactory.

Mr. Bell had been on the staff of the London & North Eastern Railway. He knew there was some disparity in the Regulations of the two former companies concerning the crossing of trains. He added that without any doubt he preferred the former London Midland & Scottish Regulation.

20. Mr. E. Balfour, Chief District Inspector, Inverness, since May 1952, said that he personally only examined men referred to him by a district inspector. He also had never heard it suggested that Rule 39(*a*) could be applied to the first of two trains approaching a single line crossing station, and he had never seen it done.

Evidence on the speed of the freight train.

21. According to the block timings the train travelled from Nairn to Gollanfield, a distance of 5½ miles, in 11 minutes. Such timings are not sufficiently accurate for calculating speeds over short distances, but in this case this time was generally confirmed by Guard Shand. The average speed of the train was therefore about 30 m.p.h. from starting at Nairn to running through Gollanfield. Taking into consideration the long rising gradient from Nairn, the speed approaching Gollanfield must have been high. The booked running time for an unfitted freight train is 13 minutes.

Guard Shand and Fireman MacKintosh both thought the speed of the train was higher than usual; in fact, Shand applied the van brake near the level crossing and before he saw the distant. Sub ganger Nicol said that it was travelling at the normal speed for "running through" when it passed the home signal.

Examination of the freight train engine.

22. After the accident, the brake handle was found in the full application position. The regulator was closed and the reversing gear was in the forward coasting position. The tender hand brake was smashed, but it appeared that it had not been applied.

After the engine was taken into the Shed at Inverness, the brake gear was examined carefully. Except for the considerable damage done to it as a result of the collision, no defect was found that would have affected the braking power. At my request, all the brake fittings were removed and refixed on another engine of the same class. I attended a number of tests which were carried out on this engine in the Shed, in all of which the brakes operated correctly.

Conclusions

23. Driver Urquhart had already set up the conditions for an accident when he allowed the freight train to approach the Gollanfield distant signal, the view of which is restricted, at a speed which was, I think, not much less than 55 m.p.h. At that speed, the stopping distance of the unfitted train was no less than about 2,300 yards provided the full brake power was used. The distance from the sighting point of the distant signal to the Up facing points is 1,800 yards, and the train would therefore have overshot them by some 500 yards.

24. Driver Urquhart, however, did not apply the full braking power for the entire distance. He made a full application somewhere near the distant signal when the fireman told him that it was at Caution, but he released the brakes soon afterwards, presumably when he saw the home signal at Clear. Thereafter he was making a normal application until the fireman jumped, but he evidently applied the brakes fully before the collision, for the handle was found in that position afterwards. It seems probable that from the distant signal to the site of the collision, the speed of the train was not reduced by more than 5–10 m.p.h. According to the signalman, the home was put back to Danger before the engine passed it but this was not confirmed by Guard Shand and Sub ganger Nicol; if it was put back, the driver clearly did not see it.

25. I have little doubt that Urquhart, like Fireman MacKintosh, either did not know about the running of the 8.17 p.m. passenger train or, if he did, thought it was running late. There was no reason for ignorance of it, as the new diagrams had been displayed in the Shed, and he had signed for the new time table. He obviously, however, expected to run through Gollanfield, otherwise he would not have placed the Nairn-Gollanfield section tablet in a pouch on the engine exchange apparatus, as it was found after the accident. Again like MacKintosh, he may have attributed the question asked by the Nairn signalman as to his running time to Gollanfield to the running of a following train. He had, however, no justification for assuming he would get a clear run through the station, but it seems probable that the clearing of the home signal when the train was still some distance from it, led him to think that "Line Clear" ahead had been received. This cannot, however, excuse him. He had been told that the distant was at Caution and he should therefore have reduced the speed considerably and been prepared to find the starter at Danger when it came into view at close range. He must have realised that no token exchange was made on the apparatus at Gollanfield, and I cannot account for his apparent complete lack of effort to control the train then and again when the starter, which was at Danger, and the passenger train came into view.

26. Urquhart was 55 years of age and was a bachelor. He had been a driver for 10 years. He knew the line well and his sight when last tested in October, 1952, was good. He had had ample rest during the previous week end. He was spoken of as a steady worker, and his record has been generally clear since 1941. A post mortem examination disclosed nothing that could account for his failure.

27. The lowering of the home signal, when the train was some distance away and was travelling at speed, must undoubtedly have seriously misled Urquhart and Signalman MacDonald's action was, therefore, largely contributory to the severity of the collision. There was no excuse for it. I think that he genuinely believed that the Regulations allowed him to lower the signal when the train was "nearly at a stand", and he said this was his usual practice. I do not accept his assertion that the Inspector had told him that this was the correct procedure, nor that he thought Rule 39(*a*) allowed it, and I feel that the latter point was put forward as an excuse.

28. The root cause of his belief may, I think, lie in the booklet entitled "Railway Block Telegraph Regulations". This was written and published in Scotland by a London & North Eastern Railway Inspector and it quotes the Regulations of that Company, without explaining that the particular London Midland & Scottish Railway Regulation is different. As has been recorded, this booklet has a wide circulation and a copy of it was at Gollanfield ; I was informed later that the signalling staff read it.

29. It was surprising to find that Mr. MacDonald, the Station Master, was himself uncertain about that Regulation. He quoted the London & North Eastern Railway practice and he also suggested that Rule 39(*a*) of the British Railways Rule Book conflicted with the London Midland & Scottish Railway Regulation on this point.

Remarks and Recommendations

30. Other accidents have occurred recently in the Scottish Region as a result of unfitted freight trains travelling at high speed, especially when approaching a station. While from an operating point of view the expeditious working of such trains is desirable, it is essential that they travel at speeds from which they can be brought under full control, having regard to the gradients and the sighting distance of signals. Apart from this aspect of the case, there are still and there will be for many years to come, a large number of freight vehicles which were not designed for high speeds. In my opinion, a speed of 45 m.p.h. is the maximum at which unfitted freight trains should travel and I recommend that this limit should be applied and enforced generally.

31. The fact that the Regulations for single line working still differ in Scotland depending on whether the section of line belonged to the London, Midland & Scottish Railway or the London & North Eastern Railway has a bearing on this accident, even though it may be only indirect. As staff are now transferred between the lines belonging to the two former Companies, I think that the Regulations throughout Scotland should be standardised. In my opinion, the London Midland & Scottish Railway Regulation for crossing trains on a single line is to be preferred.

32. The booklet referred to in paragraphs 18 and 28 was written for London & North Eastern Railway staff, but it has a circulation throughout Scotland. Such unofficial publications can be helpful to the staff, but it is important that they do not come to be regarded as the official books of Rules and Regulations.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

D. McMULLEN,
Colonel.

The Secretary,
Ministry of Transport.

BRITISH RAILWAYS
SCOTTISH REGION

To : All Concerned,

From : Operating Superintendent's Office,
302, Buchanan Street,
Glasgow.
OW.3/5037/52.
19*th February*, 1953.

SIGNALLING IRREGULARITIES

In view of the number of incidents due to signalling irregularities which are occurring, some of them with serious results, it is considered desirable to direct the attention of all signalmen to the various causes of these, so that they can guard against making similar mistakes. The following are typical cases of irregularities which have actually occurred on the Scottish Region :—

(1) Failure of signalmen to make use of Block instrument reminder or lever collar to remind him of the presence of a standing engine or train.

(2) Signalmen accepting a train under Absolute Block Regulation 4, when the line within the quarter mile or other laid down clearance point in advance of the home signal is occupied, or accepting a train under the same Regulation and thereafter permitting a movement to foul the overlap.

(3) Failure of signalman to transmit "Train entering section" signal or delay in sending such signal.

(4) Failure of signalman to send "Obstruction danger" signal for a train which is observed approaching his box and for which "Train entering section" signal has not been received.

(5) Failure of signalman to properly caution driver of a train which has been accepted by box in advance under Absolute Block Regulation 5.

(6) Signalman, unable to clear signals for a train due to the proper route not having been set up and signals held by mechanical locking, wrongly assuming that a track circuit has failed and is holding signals at danger and hand signalling driver to pass signal.

(7) Irregular use of relieving instrument to obtain a release.

(8) Irregular use of "Cancelling" signal to obtain acceptance of a following train while the section is occupied and before receipt of "Train out of section" signal for a previous train, thus freeing signal controlling entrance to the section ahead.

(9) Failure of signalman to transmit the "Blocking Back" signal when an engine or train is standing on the running lines.

(10) Failure of signalman at crossing points on single line where trains are approaching from opposite directions at the same time to maintain all signals at danger until the train, which has first to be allowed to draw forward, has been brought to a stand at the home signal, and, when this train has drawn forward to the starting signal and again come to a stand, to ensure that the reception line for the other train is clear.

(11) Failure of signalman to observe the indicator of a track circuit at an intermediate block section signal which has been passed at danger by a train with the result that the "Train or vehicle running away on right line" signal is not immediately transmitted to the box in advance.

(12) Failure of signalman to strictly comply with the terms of Rule 39(*a*).

A number of cases follow the same pattern. First there is the initial misunderstanding on the part of a signalman who either forgets an engine or train altogether or thinks it is somewhere else. From this mistake springs the second one—the all too ready assumption that the locking of the track circuit or treadle had failed, instead of the actual state of affairs being ascertained before the security of the protective locking is nullified. In other words, the signalman thinks the apparatus is at fault whereas the actual failure is in himself.

All these types of incidents can only be attributed to want of care and in the interests of safety, signalmen should be constantly on their guard against mistakes of this kind.

(*Signed*) J. McCreadie,
Operating Superintendent.

12191 ~~Wt.3247/2809~~ K8 10/53 E.D.P.Ltd.
Wt.3217/2809

SCOTTISH REGION

COLLISION AT GOLLANFIELD JUNCTION

9th. JUNE, 1953



LOCATION PLAN



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